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INTRODUCTION
The past few years have seen baseball franchises move in and out of Milwaukee,
Kansas City, Seattle, and Washington, and current rumors have the San Diego
Padres and Minnesota Twins on the verge of moving as well. Movement of baseball
franchises has become an important issue in discussions in the Congress and else-
where relative to the antitrust exemption afforded baseball. This paper attempts to
provide an economic analysis of franchise moves in professional sports within the
context of the economic theory of professional sports leagues developed in Rotten-
berg1 and EI-Hodiri and Quirk.2 The basic conclusion reached in this paper is that
while franchise moves can act as temporary expedients in correcting for an im-
balance of playing strengths and revenue potential within a sports league, such moves
offer no long-run solution to the fundamental problem that plagues professional
sports, namely the tendency of the big-city teams to dominate the sport. Further-
more, the history of franchise moves in baseball indicates that the moves that have
taken place have generally acted to intensify the extent of imbalance within baseball
rather than to correct for such imbalance. While there are some indications that
the wave of franchise moves within baseball might be coming to an end, the ex-
perience of baseball, when applied to other professional sports, offers scant evidence
of any self-regulating mechanism within sports to protect the fans of small-city
sports franchises from the threat of movement of their franchises.
Part I of this paper outlines the economic structure of a professional sports
league, a structure common to the four major team sports of baseball, football,
basketball, and hockey, and indicates the implications of this rules structure for the
distribution of playing strengths by teams within a league. The role played by
franchise moves within this structure is then discussed. Part II presents a brief his-
torical survey and analysis of franchise moves that have taken place in organized
baseball, beginning with the move of the Boston franchise to Milwaukee in 1953.
The final section of this paper discusses the public policy issues that are involved in
franchise moves.
Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology.
1 Rottenberg, The Baseball Playes" Labor Market, 64 J. POL. EcON. 242, 256-58 (1956).
2EI-Hodiri & Quirk, An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League, 79 J. POL. ECON. X302-19
(1971). A forthcoming volume from the Brookings Institution, edited by Roger Noll, presents a more
complete development of both theoretical and empirical issues arising in the economics of professional
sports.
TEAM MOVEMENTS
I
ECONOMIC STRucTURE OF A PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUE
A professional team sports league is a voluntary organization which provides an
institutional structure within which contests among the member teams can be ar-
ranged so as to determine a league champion for each season. While such an organiza-
tional structure is needed to resolve such matters as playing rules, player eligibility,
and a mutually agreed upon schedule of contests, the league also functions as a
cartel, creating and imposing constraints on the economic activities of -the member
teams. The basic rules structure governing the economic aspects of the league is the
following: (i) Each team in the league is assigned an exclusive franchise to conduct
league contests within some specific geographic area, generally restricted to within
a twenty-five to fifty mile radius about the team's playing field. (2) Contracts be-
tween teams and players contain a variant of the so-called "reserve clause," which
effectively binds the player to the team holding his contract for the length of his
playing career or until the contract is transferred to another league team.3 (3) League
rules specify the sharing of gate receipts between the home and visiting teams and
prescribe the rights to proceeds from television and radio contracts as well. Under an
antitrust exemption granted by the Congress specifically for this purpose, each of
the major professional sports leagues- can also engage in pooling operations in
negotiating nationwide television and radio contracts. (4) League rules specify
drafting procedures based on reverse order of finish in the previous season, restricting
bidding by league teams for new talent. (5) League rules govern the sale or trans-
fer of franchises, as well as the movement of franchises between geographical areas.
These and other league rules are enforced by such sanctions as fines, blacklists,
expulsion, forced sale of franchise, and so forth.
As has been noted many times before, the professional team sports league is
unique as an economic entity because the product being sold by professional sports
is competition on the playing field. In order for the league to function as a viable
economic institution, it is essential that there be uncertainty as to the outcome of
league contests. This can occur only if there is public confidence in the honesty of
contests, and only if, over the long run, playing strengths are fairly evenly dis-
tributed among the member teams in the league. Continued one-sided domination
of a league by one team ultimately leads to a lack of interest in league games not
only in the weaker cities but ultimately in the dominant city itself. This was recog-
nized, of course, very early in the history of professional sports, and the rules struc-
ture that has evolved in each of the major sports reflects a continuing attempt to solve
' The sole exception to this is the World Hockey Association (WHA) which instead utilizes a
"secondary draft" of players who have completed the terms of their contracts with teams and desire to
leave the team. Since this provision of the WHA by-laws has not yet been put into practice, it is not yet
possible to determine its effect on player mobility. Football and basketball contracts permit a player to
"play out his option" but the team holding Iis contract is indemnified by any team signing him to a new
contract.
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the basic problem of maintaining honesty and league balance in a manner that does
not interfere unduly with decentralized control of teams and with exploitation of
profitable opportunities by teams.
From the point of view of balance of the league, the basic difficulty facing pro-
fessional sports arises from the fact that franchises are located in cities of differing
revenue potential. A team located in New York or Los Angeles has considerably
higher revenue potential than one located, say, in Kansas City or Cincinnati. Con-
sequently, beginning with an equal distribution of playing strengths among teams
in a league, an additional star player is worth more to the owner of the New York
franchise than he is to the owner of a small-city franchise. If there were no reserve
clause, the higher bids for players by owners of the big-city franchises would tend
to concentrate talent in those areas and hence distort the competitive structure of the
league, perhaps ultimately destroying the league itself.4 This is the classic argument
for the reserve clause, already adopted by the early i88o's in organized baseball.
It is perhaps not surprising that this device, justified by its role in securing balance
in a league, also has the side benefit to owners of restricting the bargaining strength
of players in salary negotiations. Within ten years of its adoption, the reserve clause
brought such widespread salary reductions that it produced the famous players'
revolt leading to the formation of the Players' League in 189o. The importance of
player dissatisfaction with the reserve clause in the successful formation of the Amer-
ican League (i9oo-i9o2) is well documented.5
Even with the reserve clause, however, unrestricted bidding for new talent has
the effect of unbalancing the league in the direction of the big-city franchises, since
higher bids for new talent will be forthcoming from these teams, where the revenue
potential of the player is higher. Hence the league rules incorporate drafting pro-
cedures, permitting the small-city teams freer access to such talent. Again, not sur-
prisingly, such procedures have the effect of lowering the cost of new talent to
league teams through restricting competitive bidding for such players. Newspaper
reports of the difference between bonuses paid to new players during the AFL-NFL
war and those paid following the merger agreement (including a common draft)
give ample indication of the relevance of this point.
With a rules structure incorporating the reserve clause and a drafting procedure
based on reverse order of finish, will long-run equalization of playing strengths among
league teams be achieved? The answer is that it will not, because of the operation of
the market for player contracts. In all professional sports leagues, player contracts
'It should be pointed out, however, that as a team becomes stronger relative to the rest of the
league, each additional star player adds less and less to team revenue, and profit maximization implies
that such players are added only to the point where the additional cost associated with hiring the last
such player equals the addition he provides to revenue. Hence, even in the absence of the reserve clause,
there are incentives for big-city teams to limit their hiring of star players. See generally Rottenberg, supra
note i.
'See H. SEymotn, BASE.BAL, THE EaRY YEARs (1961); H. SEymotR, BASEBALL, TIM GOLDE AGE
(197).
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may be bought or sold or traded among league teams. The price of a player's contract
will reflect the revenue potential of a player in his best (highest revenue potential)
use. Suppose that playing talent is equally distributed among all league teams. Be-
cause an additional star player on a big-city team adds more to the revenue of that
team than the player can earn for a small-city team, the owner of the big-city
franchise is willing to pay the owner of the small-city franchise a sum which is higher
than the discounted present value of revenue that the small-city franchise can earn
by employing the player. Hence incentives are created for small-city franchises to
sell players to the big-city franchises, leading to an imbalance of playing strengths
within a league which mirrors the imbalance of revenue potential within that league.
Note that this occurs despite the reserve clause and despite the drafting arrange-
ment, since neither of these devices acts in any way to offset the difference in
revenue potential among league teams.
Thus, while the reserve clause and the draft do not accomplish the goal claimed
for them of equalizing playing strengths among league teams, the draft does play
the role of increasing the profitability of marginal franchises. This is accomplished
through the market for player contracts, with small-city teams selling newly drafted
players (or their experienced equivalents) to the big-city teams. In effect, the draft
operates to transfer economic rents from newly drafted players to the owners of
franchises by restricting the bidding for new players, these rents being capitalized
in the sales price of player contracts. The draft acts to transfer a disproportionate
share of such rents to the poorer revenue potential franchises, by assigning drafting
rights on the basis of reverse order of finish in league play.
The extent to which an imbalance in revenue potential and consequent imbalance
in playing strengths will exist in a professional sports league depends crucially on
the gate-sharing rules of the league. Such rules differ markedly among the four
major team sports. In baseball, for example, the home team receives approximately
eighty per cent of the gate with the visting team getting twenty per cent, while
local television revenues (a major source of income in baseball) go entirely to the
home team. In football, in contrast, the home team gets sixty per cent of the gate
while the great bulk of television revenues are derived from the national contract
which provides for equal sharing among league teams. The extreme case occurs in
basketball and hockey where in all leagues (NBA, ABA, WHA, NIL) the home
team gets one hundred per cent of the gate as well as all local television revenues.
While nothing short of league pooling of revenues will completely eliminate the im-
balance of revenue potential among franchises, it is dear that such an imbalance
is less under the arrangements present in football than in baseball, and less still in
basketball or hockey. It should be emphasized that more equal gate-sharing is not
argued on the basis of some notion of "fairness" but rather because, by acting to
equalize revenue potential, its effect is to enhance the competitive aspects of the
sport and thus improve the economic viability of the league.
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Given a rules structure which promotes a tendency toward marginal low profit
franchises with weak teams in small cities and profitable franchises with strong teams
in large cities, it is not surprising that franchise moves emerge as a device for
continued survival of the league. With a franchise located in a city with relatively
poor revenue potential, it is clearly in the interest of the franchise owner to move
to a city with higher revenue potential, and such a move is often in the interests of
the other team owners in the league as well. Moves which have the effect of more
evenly balancing revenue potential among league members have the long-run effect
of more evenly balancing playing strengths in the league, and hence increase public
interest and total league revenues. Thus, it is to be expected that such moves would
be approved routinely by the league.
Franchise moves which have the effect of more equally balancing revenue po-
tential within the league still leave the underlying problem of balance unsolved, how-
ever. So long as exclusivity of franchises in the large metropolitan areas continues,
franchise moves can only be temporary palliatives. No amount of movement of
franchises among smaller cities can erase the basic discrepancy in revenue potential
between New York and Los Angeles, on the one hand, and the lesser cities into
which franchise moves are made, on the other. Movement of all presently marginal
franchises simply creates another set of marginal franchises, many of which are, no
doubt, those that were originally moved.
Even a skilled franchise operator, if located in a small city, will find survival
difficult under the business rules structure of professional sports leagues. Consider
in contrast the case of an inept franchise operator in a city capable of supporting a
team, who wishes to move to avoid further losses. In an industry subject to the
pressures of the market, the firm would be forced out of business by his more
efficient competitors. What regulating mechanism operates in a sports league?
This brings us to the issue of control of franchise moves. In the organization of
a sports league, control over franchise moves is vested in the owners acting as a
group, and there are incentives operating on the owners to approve any franchise
move, whether it results in balancing the league or not. Perhaps most importantly,
the gate-sharing arrangement leads to an identification of the interests of all owners
with that of any owner proposing a move. Since the owner wishing to move feels
that he will personally benefit from the move, this is prima facie evidence from the
best possible source that there will be financial benefit for the other owners as well,
in the form of higher visiting team gate receipts. Owners of marginal franchises
have the added incentive of establishing further precedents for moves they might be
contemplating in the future, while for the wealthier clubs moves delay the day when
substantive changes have to be made in league rules to distribute revenues more
equally. Beyond this, proposals to move a team that are rejected by the league re-
sult in almost certain penalties for the franchise owner and for visiting teams at the
franchise. Such proposals seem invariably to leak to the press, resulting in a loss of
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backing for the franchise in the city in which it is located and in consequent losses
in attendance and revenue. In baseball, the cases of St. Louis (1953), Milwaukee
(1965), and Kansas City (1964-67) illustrate this point. Finally, the early franchise
moves in baseball resulted in spectacular short-run successes during a "honeymoon"
period following each move, a phenomenon, however, that seems to have vanished in
recent years. All of these factors operate towards approval of proposed franchise
moves, whatever their long-term effects on league balance.
Acting as a partial deterrent to gross misallocation of franchise locations is the
threat of emergence of a rival league. It is in this sense only that the competitive
market mechanism might-be said to act to control franchise moves. Strictly speak-
ing, this is primarily an issue concerning the expansionary policies of a league, rather
than a matter concerning the movement of existing franchises. Self-interest of league
members argues for expansion of membership in a league until all cities capable
of supporting a franchise in the sport are absorbed into the league, allowing for the
added transport and other costs incurred in such expansion. Not only does this
provide added revenue by way of initiation fees, but it also reduces the probability
of formation of a rival league. Since monopoly control of a sport is absolutely
essential to the preservation of the reserve clause and drafting system and consequent
bargain costs of players, rival leagues carry important threat value. Thus, it is to be
expected that no league will in fact abandon a potentially profitable franchise loca-
tion-or at least not for long. If the present franchise owner wishes to move, the
league will either expand or will move some existing franchise into the city to replace
the franchise that is moving. Thus franchise moves are no real problem so far as
big-city franchises are concerned; but such is not the case with small-city franchises,
which account, of course, for the bulk of the franchise moves.
The theory outlined here argues that playing strengths and profits are concen-
trated in the big-city teams in a league, that franchise moves emerge as a device
to permit small city franchises to capture short-run profits in a new market, and that
fans in small cities can expect little protection from franchise moves from the self-
regulation of the typical sports league. In the next section, we briefly review the
applicability of this theory to the history of the past twenty years of expansion and
franchise moves in organized baseball.
II
SuRVEY AND ANALYSIS OF BASEBALL FRANCHISE MovEs
For a comprehensive study of the process of franchise moves in baseball, data on
playing performance and on the financial aspects of baseball franchises are required.
Tables I-III summarize a limited amount of such information. Table I gives playing
performance by franchise over the period 1946-72 in terms of final standings in the
two major leagues. Table II presents attendance data over the same period. Table III
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slummarizes the limited amount of information that is available concerning profit-
ability of franchises, covering only the periods i946-5o, and 1952-56, the only recent
years for which complete data are available. We will return to these data later, but
here it might be noted that over the ten year period for which profits data are
available, the Brooklyn Dodgers captured forty-four per cent of total National League
profits before taxes, with the New York Yankees accounting for thirty-eight per cent
of American League profits.
Between the end of the National League-American League war in 19q3 and 1953,
the same sixteen teams in the same sixteen locations comprised the two major base-
ball leagues. Beginning with the move of the Boston Braves into Milwaukee for the
1953 season, the past twenty years has witnessed expansion of the major leagues by
eight additional teams, and the approval of ten moves of established franchises, these
franchise moves being the following:
(I) Boston Braves to Milwaukee (NL), 1953
(2) St. Louis Browns to Baltimore (AL), 1954
(3) Philadelphia Athletics to Kansas City (AL), 1955
TABLE I
TEAw FINISHES, 1946-1972
A.miacAN LEAGUE
Yr. A 0 P q0
1946 3 2 5 1 6 4 7 8
1947 1 2 6 3 4 7 8 5
1948 3 5 8 2 1 7 6 4
1949 1 4 6 2 3 8 7 5
1950 1 2 6 3 4 5 7 8
1951 1 5 4 3 2 7 8 6
1952 1 8 3 6 2 5 7 4
1953 1 6 3 4 2 5 8 7
1954 2 5 3 4 1 6 7 8
1955 1 5 3 4 2 8 7 6
1956 1 5 3 4 2 7 6 8
1957 1 4 2 3 6 8 5 7
1958 1 5 2 3 4 8 6 7
1959 3 4 1 5 2 8 6 7
1960 1 6 3 7 4 5 2 8
1961 1 2 4 6 5 9* 7 3 9 8
1962 1 4 5 8 6 10 2 7 9 3
1963 1 5 2 7 5 10 3 4 8 9
1964 1 4 2 8 6 9 6 3 10 5
1965 6 4 2 9 5 8 1 3 10 7
1966 10 3 4 9 5 8 2 1 7 6
1967 9 2 4 1 8 6 2 6 10 5
1968 5 1 9 3 4 10 7 2 6 8
1969 7 3 10 5 12 6 2 1 9* 4 8 11
1970 3 7 12 5 8 9 2 1 10 4 6 10
1971 6 3 7 5 12 11 9 1 4 2 8 10
1972 6 3 2 4 10 7 5 8 1 9 11 12
*New franchise.
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NATIONAL LEAGuE
Yr. . X W d
1946 2 8 6 3 5 7 1 4
1947 1 4 5 6 7 7 2 3
1948 3 5 7 8 6 4 2 1
1949 1 5 7 8 3 6 2 4
1950 2 3 6 7 1 8 5 4
1951 2 1 6 8 5 7 3 4
1952 1 2 6 5 4 8 3 7
1953 1 5 6 7 3 8 3 2
1954 2 1 5 7 4 8 6 3
1955 1 3 5 6 4 8 7 2
1956 1 6 3 8 5 7 4 2
1957 3 6 4 7 5 7 2 1
1958 7 3 4 5 8 2 5 1
1959 1 3 5 5 8 4 7 2
1960 4 5 6 7 8 1 3 2
1961 2 3 1 7 8 6 5 4
1962 2 1 3 9 7 4 6 5 10 8
1963 1 3 5 7 4 8 2 6 10 9
1964 6 4 2 8 2 6 1 5 10 9
1965 1 2 4 8 6 3 7 5 10 9
1966 1 2 7 10 4 3 6 5 9 8
1967 8 2 4 3 5 6 1 7 10 9
1968 7 2 4 3 7 6 1 5 9 10
1969 8 4 5 3 10 6 7 2 1 9 11 11
1970 3 4 1 5 10 2 8 8 6 7 12 11
1971 4 2 8 5 11 1 2 7 5 8 12 10
1972 4 10 2 4 12 1 7 8 6 3 11 9
Source: A EnicA1 LEAGum 1rED Boo, NATIONAL EAGU= GREEN BOOK, 1947-1973.
Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles (NL), 1958
New York Giants to San Francisco (NL), 1958
Washington Senators to Minnesota (AL), 1961
Milwaukee Braves to Atlanta (NL), 1966
Kansas City Athletics to Oakland (AL), 1968
Seattle Pilots to Milwaukee (AL), i97o
Washington Senators to Texas (AL), 1972
Before discussing these moves, it might be well to point out that prior to 1952, the
rules of organized baseball required that a franchise move by a major league team
have the unanimous approval of all owners in the-league to which the -team belonged,
and majority consent by the owners in the other major league. This rule was
changed after 1952 to make franchise moves (and expansion) a matter for the league
concerned only, with no consent required from the other major league, except in
cases of invasion of the other league's territory. Further, the requirement of unan-
imous consent was replaced by 3/4 (later, 2/3) majority of league members. Hence,
from 1953 on, approval of franchise moves became considerably easier to obtain.
As indicated in Part I, franchise moves, whether they lead to balancing the league
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or not, are expected to be approved more or less routinely by league members, as it
is in the interest both of the poorer and the richer franchises to facilitate franchise
moves. Since 1952, only two proposed moves have been voted down-the proposal of
Bill Veeck to move the St. Louis Browns, first for the 1953 season and later for the
1954 season, and the proposal of Charlie Finley to move the Kansas City Athletics
to Louisville for the 1964 season. Both Finley and Veeck may properly be described
as thorns in the side of the baseball establishment, and the refusals to permit their
proposed moves can be viewed as punishment for their aberrant behavior, as in-
dicated by the fact that the move from St. Louis to Baltimore was unanimously
agreed to once Veeck had sold his franchise, while Finley's move to Oakland was
approved after he had been subjected to four more years of reported heavy losses
in Kansas City.
The record of votes on proposed franchise moves is the following:'
National League
Boston to Milwaukee
New York to San Francisco and
Brooklyn to Los Angeles
Milwaukee to Atlanta
American League
St. Louis to Baltimore:
vote on March 24, 1953
vote on September 27, 1953
vote on September 29, 1953,
following sale of franchise
by Veeck
Philadelphia to Kansas City
Washington to Minnesota
Kansas City to Louisville (1964)
Kansas City to Oakland
Seattle to Milwaukee
Washington to Texas
unanimous for move
unanimous for joint move
unanimous for move7
5-3 against move
4-4
unanimous for move
7-I for move
6-2 for move'
9-1 against move
7-3 for move'
unanimous for move"'
io-2 for move
Excluding the cases of Veeck and Finley, the previous summary indicates the
lack of substantial opposition to any of the proposed moves, even those of a highly
controversial nature such as, for example, the moves of the Dodgers and Giants from
'Compiled on the basis of various issues of N.Y. Times, 1953-1972.
'The vote to permit the filwaukee move also required the club to fulfill its stadium contract to play
its 1965 games in ilwaukee before moving to Atlanta in x966.
'Vote coupled with expansion same year (1961) into Los Angeles and Washington.
'Vote coupled with expansion following year (1969) into Seattle and Kansas City.
"No vote reported. However, approval was granted by phone vote, hence it is presumed that the
vote was unanimous since any dissenting vote can call for a formal meeting.
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New York, the move from Milwaukee, and the recent move of the Senators' fran-
chise. Franchise moves were agreed to in the case of four cities (New York, Mil-
waukee, Washington, Kansas City) which were then given expansion franchises (in
Milwaukee's case, after a year's delay at Seattle). For Washington and Kansas City,
the reward for long years of watching second division baseball was the loss of a
team on the verge of being a playing success, to obtain another sure second division
team.
It might be thought that franchise moves occur because of an irresistible offer to
an owner to sell the franchise to someone in another city. Actually, of the ten fran-
chise moves only three involved a change in ownership. In all other cases, the same
owner retained title to the franchise. Ownership changes occurred in the move of
the Browns (Veeck in effect being forced to sell to a group of Baltimore civic leaders
before the move would be approved), in the move of the Athletics to Kansas City
(the Mack family selling its holdings to Arnold Johnson), and in the move of the
Pilots (the Daley-Soriana interests selling to a group of Milwaukee business leaders).
It might be mentioned that the Seattle franchise was reportedly on the brink of
TABLE II
ATEm DAC BY TE.m, i946-x972
A Riecrx LEAGUE
:4 al 0 .
Yr ~ 0 . q 0 p-, 0 Pq
1946 9621 1203 2266 1723 983 1417 1057 1027 - 622 - - 526- -----
1947 9486 1186 2179 1398 877 1427 1522 851 - 912 - - 320- -----
1948 11151 1394 2374 1743 778 1559 2621 795 - 945 - - 336- -----
1949 10732 1342 2284 1821 937 1597 2234 771 - 817 - - 271- -----
1950 9131114120811951 7811344 1727 700 - 310 - - 247- -----
1951 8482 1060 1950 1133 1328 1312 1705 695 - 465 - - 294 . .-.----
1952 8295 1037 1630 1027 1232 1116 1445 699 - 627 - - 519 -.- .--.-
1953 6965 871 1538 885 1192 10261069 596 - 362 - - 297- -----
1954 7622 953 1475 1080 1232 931 1335 504 - 305 - - - 1061 - -
1955 8943 1118 1490 1182 1176 1203 1222 425 - - 1393 - - 852 - -
1956 7893 987 1492 1051 1000 1137 865 432 - - 1015 - - 901 - -
1957 8196 1024 1497 1272 1136 1181 722 457 - - 901 - - 1030 - -
1958 7297 912 1428 1099 797 1077 664 475 - - 925 - - 830 - -
1959 9149 1144 1552 12211423 984 1498 615 - - 964 - - 892 - -
1960 9226 1153 1627 1168 1644 1130 951 743 - - 775 - - 1188 - -
1961 11165 1119 1748 1601 1146 851 726 597* 1257 - 684 - - 951 604 - -
1962 10016 1002 1494 1208 1132 733 716 730 1433 - 636 - - 790 1144 - -
1963 9106 9111309 8221159 943 563 536 1407 - 762 - - 774 821 - -
1964 9234 923 1306 816 1250 883 653 600 1208 - 642 - - 1116 760 - -
1965 9080 908 1214 1030 1131 652 935 560 1463 - 528 - - 762 567 - -
1966 10165 1017 1125 1124 990 811 903 576 1259 - 774 - - 1203 1400 - -
1967 11233 1123 1260 1447 986 1728 663 771 1484 - 721 - - 955 1318 - -
1968 11316 1132 1186 2032 804 1941 848 547 1143 - - 837 - 944 1026 - -
1969 12130 10111068 1577 590 1833 620 918 1349 - 902* 779 - 1058 758 678 -
1970 12035 1003 1137 1501 4951595 730 825 1262 - 693 778 - 1057 1078 - 934 -
1971 11369 947 1071 1591 8341679 591 655 941 - 911 915 - 1023 926 - 732 -
1972 11437 953 966 189211177 1442 626 - 798 - 708 921 - 900 744 - 600 663
*Now franchhis.
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NATiONAL LEotm
Yr. H Z ,i W o 4 M'
1946 8902 1112 1797 - 1220 - 716 970 - - 1343 750 1062 1045 - - - -
1947 10388 1299 1808 - 1601 - 900 1277 - - 1364 1284 1248 907 - - - -
1948 9771 1221 1399 - 1459 - 823 1455 - - 1238 1517 1111 767 - - - -
1949 9485 1186 1634 - 1218 - 706 1082 - - 1143 1499 1431 820 - - - -
1950 83211040 1186 - 1009 - 539 944 - - 1166 1166 1093 1217 - - - -
1951 7244 906 1283 - 1060 - 588 488 - - 894 9811013 938 - - - -
1952 6342 793 1089 - 985 - 607 281 - - 1025 687 913 755 - - - -
1953 7421 928 1163 - 812 - 548 - 1827 - 764 573 880 854- - - -
1954 8014 1002 1021 - 1155 - 704 - 2131 - 748 476 1040 739 - - - -
1955 7676 959 1034 - 824 - 694 - 2006 - 876 469 849 923 - - - -
1956 8650 1081 1214 - 629 - 1126 - 2046 - 720 9501030 935 - - - -
1957 8821 1103 1029 - 654 - 1071 - 2215 - 671 851 1184 1146 - - - -
1958 10166 1271 - 1846 - 1273 789 - 1971 - 980 1312 1064 931 - - - -
1959 9994 1249 - 2071 - 1422 801 - 1749 - 858 1360 930 803 - - - -
1960 106851336 - 2254 - 1795 663 - 1498 - 810 1706 1097 862 - - - -
1961 8642 1080 - 1804 - 1391 1118 - toll - 673 1199 855 590 - - - -
1962 11362 1136 - 2755 - 1593 982 - 767 - 610 1091 954 762 923 925 - -
1963 11304 1130 - 2539 - 1571 859 - 773 - 980 784 1171 907 1080 720 - -
1964 120451205 - 2229 - 1504 862 - 911 - 752 759 11431426 1733 726 - -
1965 13580 1358 - 2554 - 1546 1048 - 556 - 641 909 1241 1166 1768 2151 - -
1966 16034 1503 - 2617 - 1657 743 - - 1540 636 1197 1731 1108 1933 1872 - -
1967 12969 1270 - 1664 - 1242 958 - - 1389 977 907 2090 829 1565 1348 - -
1968 11785 1179 - 1581 - 837 733 - - 1127 1043 693 2011 665 1782 1313 - -
1969 15095 1258 - 1785 - 874 988 - - 1458 1675 769 1683 519 2175 1443 513 1213
1970 16663 1390 - 1697 - 741 1804 - - 1079 1643 1342 1630 708 2697 1253 644 1425
1971 17326 1444 - 2065 - 1106 1501 - - 1006 1653 1501 1605 1511 2267 1262 558 1291
1972 15538 1296 - 1861 - 648 16111 - - 753 1299 1427 1197 1343 2134 1469 644 1142
Source: AmRmmC LZAGuE RED BoOE, NATioAL LEAGUE Gim,. BooK, 1947-1973.
bankruptcy, and both the Athletics and Browns had suffered severe losses in the
years preceding the franchise move, as indicated in Table III. Thus, the typical fran-
chise move has been one in which the franchise owner sees higher profit potential
in some other location, rather than a sale to interested parties in some other city.
In such cases, as noted above, it makes economic sense to the other owners to accept
the franchise owner's appraisal of such profit opportunities and agree to the move.
The traditional justification for a proposed franchise move is lack of fan support.
The evidence for such lack of support is low attendance and monetary losses. Table
IV summarizes the data available on attendance, profits, and league standing for ten
years preceding each franchise move.
The data indicate clearly the difficulty with the "lack of fan support" argument.
Teams with the playing records of the St. Louis Browns, Philadelphia Athletics,
Washington Senators (both dubs) and the Kansas City Athletics would have
difficulty drawing wherever they were located. In fairness, the Dodgers did not
argue lack of fan support, but rather the inability to acquire a new park. In fact,
the city of New York agreed to build a park (in the precise location of the present
Shea Stadium) months before the Dodgers moved. Lack of fan support also rings
a little hollow in the cases of Milwaukee, the Giants, and the Boston Braves, unless
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TABLE III
PRoFITS BEFORE TAXES BY TEm, 1946-195o, 1952-1956
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
American
League 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 Avg.
New York 809 847 516 347 497 686 987 501 803 863 686
Detroit 467 197 255 33 113 -26 44 115 530 530 237
Chicago 291 209 69 103 65 162 462 450 441 331 248
Boston 405 -95 -203 21 -101 -342 -421 3 243 122 -37
Cleveland 376 319 500 506 459 368 355 1144 412 -167 427
Washington 357 457 261 -18 5 110 44 96 6 36 135
St. Louis 260 303 157 83 43 -330 -707 - - - -27
Baltimore . - .- -- - - 654 -87 74 214
Philadelphia 83 130 233 90 -316 , -51 -102 -218 - - -19
Kansas City -. - - - --- - - 37 2 19
Average 381 308 224 146 96 72 83 356 398 224 229
National
League
Brooklyn 412 519 543 643 -9 .. 673 356 455 825 1120 554
New York -211 520 -114 -88 -264 o -222 -63 646 250 121 58
Cincinnati 192 208 164 73 65 -68 17 75 99 532 136
Boston 40 229 238 148 -317 -459 - - - - -4
Milwaukee -.- .- .- -- 677 960 1090 1044 968
Chicago 510 279 141 212 -133 187 -418 -72 83 -150 64
Pittsburgh 72 39 66 195 138 -677 -421 -198 -602 -48 -144
St. Louis 699 631 609 358 263 -40 -702 -534 -43 329 157
Philadelphia 125 64 198 47 310 -118 -10 -256 -264 -1 9
Average 230 311 231 199 7 -33 -71 135 180 368 156
Sources: 1946-1950: Sucosm. ON STUDY oP MONOPOLY Pown oF THE HOUsn ComM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Oa ANzED BASEBALL,H.I. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
1952-1956: Hearings on H.R. 807, H.R. 5819, H.R. 5883, H.R. 6876, H.R. 6877, H.R. 8028, and H.R. 8124 Before the Anti-
tnsut Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiiary, 85th Cong., st Ses., se. 8, pt. 1, at 1297-99 (1957).
two or three years attendance is projected into the indefinite future (1965 Milwaukee
attendance is for the year following the announcement of the move to Atlanta) 31
Following the Milwaukee move to Atlanta, considerable attention was directed
toward the influence of television revenues on the propensity of franchise owners
to pull up stakes. Table V summarizes TV and radio receipts by franchise over the
periods x952-1973, with data for 1952-1956 including national TV, while data for
I960-1973 are for local contracts only.
Briefly, the yearly gain in TV revenues associated with each move is as follows:
Boston to Milwaukee
St. Louis to Baltimore
Philadelphia to Kansas City
Brooklyn to Los Angeles
New York to San Francisco
-$I75,000
+$257,00
--$ 90,v0
Not available
(953 vs- 1952)
(954 vs. 1953)
( 955 Vs. 1954)
"I The profit data is ambiguous as well. Thus the Celler Committee report notes that the St. Louis
Browns sold $5,29o,ooo worth of players between 1947 and I95I; if taken into account, profits for St.
Louis in 1947, 1948, 1949, and i95o look more like the figure for 1952, bolstering the argument for the
Browns' move. SuBcomrm. oNe Svunv op MONOPOLY PowER oF TvHE House Com. on the JuICrmARY, OR-
OANIZED BASEBALL, H.R. No. 2oo2, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1952).
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TABLE IV
ATTENDANCE (IN THOUSANDS), PROFITS BEFORE TAxES (N THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS),
AND LEAGUE STANDING ix TEN YEARs PRECEDING MOVE
Boston (NL) 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Attendance 271 209 374 970 1277 1455 1082 944 488 281
Profits -41 133 137 40 229 238 148 -317 n.a. -459
Standing 6 6 6 4 3 1 4 4 4 7
St. Louis (AL) 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Attendance 509 483 526 320 336 271 247 294 519 298
Profits .285 30 260 303 157 83 43 n.a. -330 -707
Standing 1 3 7 8 6 7 7 8 7 8
Philadelphia (AL) 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Attendance 463 622 912 945 817 310 465 627 362 305
Profits -17 83 130 233 90 -316 n.a. -51 -102 -218
Standing 8 8 5 4 5 8 6 4 7 8
Brooklyn (NL) 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Attendance 1399 1634 1186 1283 1089 1163 1021 1034 1214 1028
Profits 543 643 -9 n.a. 673 356 455 825 1120 n.a.
Standing 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 3
New York (NL) 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Attendance 1459 1218 1009 1060 985 812 1155 824 629 654
Profits -114 -88 -264 n.a. -222 -63 646 250 121 n.a.
Standing 5 5 3 1 2 5 1 3 6 6
Washington (AL) 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Attendance 695 699 596 504 425 432 457 475 615 743
Profits n.a. 110 44 96 6 36 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Standing 7 5 5 6 .8 7 8 8 8 5
Milwaukee (NL) 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Attendance 2046 2215 1971 1749 1498 1011 767 773 911 556
Profits 1044 Not Available
Standing 2 1 1 2 2 4 5 6 5 5
Kansas City(A.L)* 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Attendance 925 964 775 684 636 762 642 528 774 721
Standing 7 7 8 9 9 8 10 10 7 10
Seattle (AL)* 1969
Attendance 678
Standing 11
Washington (AL)* 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Attendance 730 536 600 560 576 771 547 918 825 655
Standing 10 10 9 8 8 6 10 6 9 11
Sources: AmEaaxca Ln AGUn RED Boox and NATIONAL LEAGU GREN Boos, 1944-1973; SucconL ON STUDY o MONOPOLY Powen
OF THfl HouSE CoM. oN TGE JUDIMc-R', ORaoZED BEBLu,, H... RREP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d SesS. (1952); HCOrin03 on il.R. 6807,
H.R. 6819, H.R. 5883, HR. 6876, H. 6877, H.R. 8023, and H.R. 8124 Before the Antitrut Subcomm. of thf House Comm. on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 1st Sees., set. 8, pt. 1 (1957).
*No data on profits available.
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Washington to Minnesota +$400,ooo (i96i vs. 196o)
Milwaukee to Atlanta +$8ooooo (1966 vs. 1964)
Kansas City to Oakland +$800,ooo (1968 vs. 1966)
Seattle to Milwaukee -50,000 (i97o vs. 1969)
Washington to Texas No change (1972 vs. 197)
Because the last year in Milwaukee and in Kansas City reflected knowledge that the
franchise was moving, comparisons are with the previous year.
Of the ten franchise moves, three (Washington, Milwaukee, and Kansas City)
were certainly influenced by TV revenues, and this might also have been a factor
in the move of St. Louis. At $3 a ticket, the moves of Milwaukee and Kansas City
resulted in the equivalent of 25oooo additional attendance, for example. Newspaper
reports indicate that the prospect of pay-TV (which ultimately fell through) was of
central importance in the moves of the Dodgers and the Giants. In summary, TV
revenues have played an important role in roughly half of the moves that have taken
place. It should be noted that under a TV sharing arrangement as in the NFL, or
even under a spilt with visiting teams, the TV lure would be much less of an in-
centive for moves.
The crucial question to raise concerning franchise moves is the effect of such
moves on balance within a league. No one would argue that even the grant of anti-
trust exemption, as in the case of baseball, imposes the obligation on baseball to
maintain franchises in cities that are clearly too small to support a team even under
the most generous rules concerning gate-sharing. But certainly there is an obligation
to restrict franchise moves to those that are rendered necessary to balance more
evenly the league in terms of drawing potential.
Table VI summarizes the effect on league balance of the ten moves that have
taken place in professional baseball, comparing population in the city from which
the move took place with population in the city to which the franchise moved, and
with average population per league city.
TABLE VI
FRANcmsE MovEs AND LEAGuE BALANCO*
Population (000) Population (000) Avg. Pop. (000)
Franchise Move of City pre-move of City post-move per league city
Boston to Milwaukee 1,297 1,270 2,304
St. Louis to Baltimore 1,053 1,804 2,367
Philadelphia to Kansas City 2,172 1,093 2,494
Brooklyn to Los Angeles 3,565 6,039 2,302
New York to San Francisco 3,565 2,649 2,302
Washington to Minnesota 2,064 1,482 2,359
Milwaukee to Atlanta 1,404 1,390 3,375
Kansas City to Oakland 1,257 1,555 2,770
Seattle to Milwaukee 1,422 1,404 2,556
Washington to Texas 2,861 1,556 2,555
*For moves before 1966, 1960 data are used; for moves in 1966 and after, 1970 data are used. Population is population in the standard
metropolitan area divided by the number of teams in the area.
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Population is admittedly a rather crude measure of revenue potential, but even
this crude measure gives some indication of the balancing effect of the franchise
moves that have taken place. A franchise move tends to balance more equally the
league if the city to which the franchise is moved is closer to the league average than
the city from which the move occurred. Given this criterion, only three of the ten
moves represent moves that balanced the league-the move from St. Louis to Balti-
more, the move from New York to San Francisco, and the move from Kansas City
to Oakland. Interestingly, the move to Oakland had the side effect of reducing the
drawing potential of the Giants franchise to a level substantially below the average
for the National League. Hence, taking this side effect into account, only one move
qualifies as a balancing move (in terms of population)-the move of the Browns,
which was the first move proposed, and one which was rejected twice by the Amer-
ican League owners.
What is perhaps of more importance is that in eight of the ten moves, the city
to which the franchise was moved had a population substantially less than the league
average per franchise. Given the business rules structure of baseball, such cities are
prime candidates for further franchise moves, and such has occurred already in two
cases, while Minnesota, San Francisco, and Texas are certainly not solid franchises
at the present moment.
Finally, we might ask how successful the moves have been. Here the answer
must again be qualified to take into account the playing success of the team and to
reflect the honeymoon phenomenon. Table VII summarizes attendance data for
moved franchises.
Looking at average attendance records and using the crude yardstick of one
million attendance as the break-even point, five of the ten franchise moves have
been successful (Milwaukee (first team), Los Angeles, San Francisco, Minnesota and
Atlanta), one is on the margin of success (Baltimore), and four have been failures
(Kansas City, Oakland, Milwaukee (second team), Texas). One of the successes
(Milwaukee) and one of the failures (Kansas City) resulted in further franchise
moves. With the exception of Atlanta, all of the successes occurred with teams of
above average playing records, while Baltimore and Oakland have had successful
playing records but less success at the gate. Of the successful moves, Milwaukee
lost its team, and recent rumors suggest that San Francisco (or Oakland) and Min-
nesota are possible contenders for a future move. Given this history, it would be
difficult to judge the period of franchise moves as a success in terms of the results
at the new franchise locations. Los Angeles emerges as the rare exception, but the
only rational way to view the Los Angeles move is as Walter O'Malley's method
of capitalizing on expansion of the National League-the moves to Los Angeles
and San Francisco should be coupled with the expansion into New York and
Houston and thought of as a combined operation. In this sense, these moves are
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somewhat different from the other franchise moves that occurred, although the move
to Minnesota might be given much the same interpretation.
The data on attendance records highlights the honeymoon period following a
franchise move, particularly in the cases of Kansas City and Atlanta. The absence
of a honeymoon period following the moves to Oakland, Milwaukee (second team),
and Texas is further substantiated by the data from Table I for Seattle, San Diego
and Kansas City (1969-1972) -after 1966, the honeymoon period seems to have
vanished.
We might briefly summarize the findings of this section as follows. Generally
speaking, (i) franchise moves have been approved without substantial opposition by
other owners; (2) the justification for moves of "lack of fan support" is in most cases
of dubious validity; (3) franchise moves have not had the effect of more evenly
balancing revenue potential within the league; (4) the assignment of all local TV
revenues to the home team has been an important element in roughly half of the
moves; (5) the moves have not been particularly successful in terms of long-run
viability at the new locations.
TABLE VIII
EsrTMAs op GATE AND TV-RADIO R ENUE, 1972*
TV &
Attendance Gate Receipts Radio(Incl.
Home Away Home Away Nat'l) Total
American League (000) (000) $ (000) $ (000) $ (000) 3 (000)
New York 966 1,135 2,318 681 2,025 5,024
Detroit 1,892 1,062 4,541 637 1,925 7,103
Chicago 1,177 936 2,825 556 1,725 5,106
Boston 1,442 987 3,461 592 1,425 5,478
Cleveland 626 996 1,502 598 1,525 3,625
Texas 663 771 1,591 463 1,575 3,629
Minnesota 798 847 1,915 508 1,575 3,998
Oakland 921 1,116 2,210 670 1,725 4,605
California 744 815 1,786 489 1,725 4,000
Milwaukee 600 836 1,440 502 1,325 3,267
Baltimore 900 1,243 2,160 746 1,500 4,406
Kansas City 708 695 1,699 417 1,375 3,491
National League
Los Angeles 1,861 1,441 4,466 865 2,525 7,856
San Francisco 648 1,349 1,555 809 1,825 4,189
Cincinnati 1,611 1,403 3,866 842 2,025 6,733
San Diego 644 1,023 1,546 614 1,435 3,595
Montreal 1,142 1,104 2,741 662 1,325 4,728
Atlanta 753 1,396 1,807 838 1,725 4,370
Chicago 1,299 1,330 3,118 798 1,725 5,641
New York 2,134 1,502 5,122 901 1,925 7,948
Pittsburgh 1,427 1,373 3,425 824 1,175 5,424
St. Louis 1,197 1,274 2,873 764 1,525 5,162
Philadelphia 1,343 1,071 3,223 643 2,225 6,091
Houston 1,469 1,262 3,526 757 1,725 6,008
*Revenues were estimated as follows. Average ticket prices were taken to be$3 per admission at each franchise. It was assumed that
the gate split was 80-20 between the home and visiting team. National TV revenues were estimated at $725,000 per team and added to
local TVoIadio revenues as reported in Broadcasting.Attendance data from Axneaacmi LEAGu RaD Booa and NATiONAL L.Aanu GRESEN Boos, 1973.
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Finally, we conclude this section by returning to the central theme of Part I-
that the rules structure of baseball (and of the other professional sports) tends to
concentrate both playing skills and profits in the big-city franchises at the expense
of the small-city franchises. Table VIII gives a rough estimate of gate receipts
and revenues from TV and radio by franchise for 1972, indicating the disparity
between revenue at cities such as Kansas City, Milwaukee and San Diego, and
cities such as Los Angeles and New York.
The estimates given are admittedly crude and furthermore are for a single year,
yet the difficulty of supporting a franchise in a small city, while bidding in a com-
mon market for player contracts against big-city teams, is at least indicated.
TABLE IX
HOME-AwAY ATTENDANCE, 1962-1971
Avg. attendance per Years over
yr. (thousands) Attendance one million
Home Away Home Away
American League total total p. cap. p. cap. Home Away
New York ................ 1217 1531 .21 .63 10 10
Detroit .................. 1315 1045 .31 .41 8 7
Chicago .................. 937 969 .27 .41 4 2
Boston ................. 1280 936 .46 .35 5 5
Cleveland ................ 723 808 .35 .29 0 3
Washington .............. 672 798 .24 .30 0 2
Minnesota ................ 1295 1064 .71 .38 9 7
Oakland .................. 827 1039 .53 .37 0 Id
California ................ 980 840 .69 .30 5 0
Seattle ................... 678 890 .48 .31 0 03
Milwaukee ............... 833 757 .59 .27 0 0b
Baltimore ................ 968 1124 .47 .41 5 7
Kansas City (old) ......... 677 717 .54 .25 0 0e
Kansas City (new)........ 835 836 .66 .29 0 0c
Avg. attendance per Years over
yr. (thousands) Attendance one million
Home Away Home Away
National League total total p. cap. p. cap. Home Away
Los Angeles .............. 2149 1584 .31 .55 10 10
San Francisco ............. 1267 1755 .48 .53 7 10
Cincinnati ................ 1048 1290 .76 .38 3 10
San Diego ................ 572 1129 .42 .33 0 2a
Montreal ................. 1310 1097 .58 .33 3 2a
Atlanta .................. 1267 1317 .91 .39 6 6e
Chicago .................. 1061 1221 .30 .38 4 8
New York Mets ........... 1792 1099 .31 .37 9 6
Pittsburgh ................ 995 1290 .41 .39 4 10
St. Louis ................. 1524 1375 .64 .41 9 10
Philadelphia .............. 960 1177 .20 .38 4 8
Houston ................. 1301 983 .66 .29 7 4
Milwaukee ............... 752 1227 .54 .36 0 4d
a-rn leagu 1 yr.; b-in league 2 yes.; c-in league 3 yrs.; d-in league 4 yrs.; e-in league 6 yrs.
Sources: ArLmRICAN LnauiTn RED BOO, NATIONAL LEAGUE GREsEN Boox, 1963-1973.
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A somewhat more revealing picture of the problem of small-city franchises is
given in Table IX, which compares home and away attendance by franchise over
the period 1962-1971.
The data in Table IX are relevant with respect to several issues. First, how at-
tractive in terms of customer interest are the different teams? Second, how well do
small cities support their teams as compared with the larger cities? Third, how often
do the small-city teams break even in attendance?
A crude measure of the drawing potential of a team (rather than a franchise)
is given by how the team draws on the road, and comparisons are given between
average home attendance and average road attendance. On a priori grounds, if all
teams were equally attractive, one would expect the big-city teams to draw more at
home than away and the opposite to be true for the small-city teams. While Table
TABLE X
DisnuBUTION OP MAJOR LEAGUE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FRANCHISES
By METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1972, UmrrT STATEs
1970 1970 Franchises
Population Metropolitan Population
Rank Area (in thousands) Baseball Hockey Basketball Football
1 New York 11,529 2 3 2 2
2 Los Angeles 7,032 1 2 1 1
3 Chicago 6,979 2 2 1 1
4 Philadelphia 4,818 1 2 1 1
5 Detroit 4,200 1 1 1 1
6 San Francisco-
Oakland 3,110 2 1 1 2
7 Washington, D.C. 2,861 - - - 1
8 Boston 2,754 1 2 1 1
9 Pittsburgh 2,401 1 1 - 1
10 St. Louis 2,363 1 1 - 1
11 Baltimore 2,071 1 - 1 1
12 Cleveland 2,064 1 1 1 1
13 Houston 1,985 1 1 1 1
14 Newark 1,857 - - - -
15 Minneapolis-
St. Paul 1,814 1 2 - 1
16 Dallas 1,556 1 - 1 1
17 Seattle 1,422 - - 1 -
18 Anaheim 1,420 1 - - -
19 Milwaukee 1,404 1 - 1 1
20 Atlanta 1,390 1 1 1 1
21 Cincinnati 1,385 1 - - 1
22 Patterson-
Passaic, N.J. 1,359 - - -
23 San Diego 1,358 1 - 1 1
24 Buffalo 1,349 - 1 1 1
25 Miami 1,268 - - - 1
26 Kansas City 1,257 1 - 1 1
27 Denver 1,228 - - 1 1
28 San Bernardino 1,143 - - - -
29 Indianapolis 1,110 - - 1 -
30 San Jose 1,065 - - - -
Totals 23 21 20 25
Additional teams: Baseball-Montreal; Basketball-Phoenix, Portland (NBA); Virginia, Kentuft, Carolina, Utah, Memphi (ABA);
Football-New Orleans; Hockey-Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver (NEL); Ottawa, Quebec, Winnipeg, Calgary (WHA).
Source: The Sporting News.
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IX indicates that this is generally the case, there are some interesting exceptions,
particularly the New York Yankees, St. Louis Cardinals and Houston Astros. But
a more relevant measure is certainly per-capita attendance at home and away. Pre-
sumably if every team were equally attractive, the per-capita attendance would be
independent of size of city. In fact, as the table indicates, the small-city franchises in-
variably outdraw the big-city franchises on a per-capita basis, so that we have the
anomaly of the highly successful New York Mets and L.A. Dodgers drawing less
than half as much on a per-capita basis as the new Kansas City team, which is re-
garded as something of a box office failure. The consequence, of course, is that the
small-city teams rarely make it to the magic one million attendance break-even point,
as indicated by the last two columns of the table. The problems for franchises such as
Minnesota and Atlanta are clearly indicated by the table. These franchises have
been successful only because they have achieved what appear to be standards of per-
capita attendance at home that are highly unlikely to continue over time, and Cin-
cinnati suffers from the same basic problem. It appears that the small-city franchises
have generally performed quite well in terms of attendance, if measured against
big-city standards, but in the absence of equitable revenue-sharing arrangements, the
small cities are unlikely to operate profitable franchises.
Will the era of franchise moves continue, or are there indications that perhaps
it has run its course? There are at least two encouraging signs. For baseball, the
honeymoon phenomenon seems to be at an end, and without this stimulus, owners
might be more reluctant to look for greener pastures. The other encouraging sign is
that by now, expansion in baseball and in the other major team sports has pretty well
blanketed the country, as indicated in Table X. Perhaps the era will end because
there isn't any place else to go.
FRANcmsE MovEs: Ti PuBLIc POLICY IssuEs
At least since the time of Adam Smith, economists have been extolling the virtues
of a competitive price system in which the market determines the answers to the
questions of "what is to be produced, how is it to be produced, and who gets it." In
such a system, if a shoe manufacturer decides to move his plant from one city to
another because of the higher profit potential of the second location, the inhabitants
of the first town generally suffer some injury and those of the second, some gain; but
interference with such moves would effectively stifle the most important virtue of
the price system, its flexibility of response to changes in tastes and technology. In
professional sports, a franchise is moved from one city to another because the owner
sees more profit potential in the second location. Is there any more justification for
interfering with such a move than in the case of the shoe manufacturer?
The argument for the need to impose constraints on moves and other aspects
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of professional sports is the old, classic argument concerning monopoly. If a firm
obtains monopoly control over an industry, it sets price higher and output lower than
would be the case under competition in the industry, distorting the allocation of re-
sources in the economy. Under rather general conditions it can be shown that im-
posing controls (marginal cost pricing requirements) on the monopolist leads to a
situation in which all consumers in the economy can be made better off than was
the case with an unfettered monopoly operating. In professional sports, monopoly
control of the sport is the typical situation. To be sure, when profits become ex-
cessive or if the league is run in a particularly inept fashion, competitive leagues
arise or are threatened, but these challenges invariably lead to merger and return
to a monopoly position. Historical examples abound-the merger of the American
and National Baseball Leagues in 19o2; buying off of the owners of the Federal
League in 1915; absorption of the profitable franchises in the All American Confer-
ence into the National Football League in i95o; merger of the NFL and AFL in
the mid-i96o's; the proposed NBA-ABA merger; and so forth. As mentioned earlier,
monopoly control of a sports industry is essential to maintaining such devices as the
reserve clause and drafting rules; with competition between leagues, rents accrue to
players, and franchises lose their profitability. Because the incentives for monopoly
control are so strong, it is not possible to rely on the market to regulate activities in
the professional sports industries-competitive leagues simply will not and have not
survived.
Given the existence of a monopoly in a sport, the franchise owner is in a position
to capture those rents that accrue to a monopolist. This is not to say that every team
owner makes huge profits. In fact, the argument of this paper is that owners of the
small-city franchises will generally be involved in marginal operations. The rules
structure of professional sports tends to concentrate the monopoly gains from the
sport in the hands of the big-city franchise owners. If anything, this produces
pressures on the small-city franchises to recoup by exploiting the mobility of
the franchise in obtaining financial concessions from the city in which the franchise
is located. This use of the scarcity value of a franchise is indicated by the wave of
publicly financed stadiums that have been constructed in such cities as Oakland,
Anaheim, Kansas City, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, New York, and, of
course, Washington-stadiums that rarely pay their own way. Through artificially
low rental charges, these stadiums represent subsidies to the teams using them
in efforts to keep the franchise from moving. It is trite but true that a major league
franchise has value to the city possessing such a franchise over and beyond the
revenues accruing to the franchise owner through ticket sales and television revenues.
Economists assume that if these additional values can be appropriated they will be,
and public stadiums represent one way in which franchise owners can appropriate
part of these revenues.
Traditionally, economists have been reluctant to advocate non-market institutions
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to solve problems the market is designed to handle. Certainly, the history of reg-
ulatory commissions is not one which instills overwhelming confidence in such a
device as a protector of the interests of the general public. Businessmen involved in
the day-to-day decisions of running their firms are in a much better position to make
judgments than the bureaucrat. Furthermore, regulatory commissions have the
unhappy history of often developing into more effective cartel organizations than
could have been created by the businesses themselves. Hence, the suggestion to cor-
rect some of the worst abuses of professional sports by appointing a federal sports
czar is not appealing.
It should be emphasized that despite its many problems, organized baseball has
survived and flourished for almost one hundred years. Such an organization can
survive and grow only because it is adaptable to change, at least in the long run.
But organized baseball is also a monopoly, and certainly a monopoly which, in addi-
tion, markets a product that ranks with motherhood and apple pie should do well.
There are abuses in each of the sports leagues, of which the wave of franchise moves
in baseball is only one example; problems with players concerning the reserve clause
give rise to many more. Solutions suggested to these problems by outsiders, however
well intended, lack the essential ingredient of intimate knowledge of the complexities
of the industry. Hence, it seems apparent that corrections for the abuses of sports
should come from within the industry itself, and the proper role for public policy
to play is that of insuring that pressure is brought to bear to force the industry to
devise solutions to its problems. No doubt there are many possible ways to imple-
ment this, but at a minimum, this means that with respect to franchise moves in par-
ticular, cities losing franchises should have the right to bring suit for triple damages
under the antitrust laws. The problem of estimating damages is admittedly a thorny
one. One method of estimating the loss to the city is to use the maximum bid that
would be forthcoming from investors to purchase the franchise for retention in the
city, less the market value of players under contract to the club. The argument is
that this figure represents the scarcity value of a franchise located in the city, the
scarcity value being directly attributable to monopoly control of the sport by the
league. Thus, in the case of the Washington franchise, the reported $9 million bid
by the Veeck group to keep the franchise in Washington would form the basis for
a triple damages suit under the antitrust laws.
CONCLUSION
Organized baseball has created the problem of franchise moves by adopting a
business rules structure that makes it extremely difficult for a small-city franchise
to survive, while permitting small cities to obtain baseball franchises, in part at least
to preclude the emergence of rival baseball leagues. This is a problem which has
many parallels in other industries to which the antitrust statutes have been applied.
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Application of the antitrust laws to baseball offers the only practical possibility of
control of the abuses of franchise moves, since the record indicates quite dearly that
organized baseball is incapable or unwilling to reform either its revenue-sharing
arrangements or its rules governing location of franchises to put an end to such
abuses.
